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PATENTS AND ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED




The plans of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the
field of industrial property, and the influence that the Community's
evolving policies on restrictive business practices will exert on these
plans, are best understood if the nature of the association is kept in
mind. The charter of the EEC was not designed to oversee a tariff or
customs union; rather, the six member countries sought to build
an economic union.' The Iron and Coal and the Euratom Treaties are
limited in scope, but the Rome Treaty creating the European Eco-
nomic Community was a bold and visionary step toward ultimate
political integration.2
An economic union requires common policies. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the Treaty of Rome lays down as some of its principal
goals the elimination of distortions of competition and the abolition of
obstacles to the free movements of persons, services and capital within
the Community.a There would be no purpose in abolishing tariff
barriers within the Community if the community market could also be
dissected by tax privileges, state aids, the use of national industrial
property rights, or private agreements and monopolistic abuses which
restrain the free flow of goods.'
* Partner, Fowler, Knobbe & Gambrel!, Santa Ana, California. Formerly Director,
Office of Legislative Planning, United States Patent Office. Member of California, Okla-
homa and District of Columbia Bars.
Professor Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Eco-
nomic Community, delivered an excellent series of lectures on the origin, posture and
aspirations of the EEC in 1962 at Tufts University. They are reprinted in the CCH
Common Market Rep. if 9001. See generally, 1960 Institute on Legal Aspects of the
European Community, Fed. Bar. Assoc., Washington, D.C.
2 Hallstein, supra note 1. But see, Coing, Interpretational Problems of Article 85,
38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 441 (1963).
One of the best references on the European Community, although it was published
in 1960, is the two volume set: American Enterprise in the European Common Market—
A Legal Profile (Stein & Nicholson ed. 1960). The CCH Common Market Reporter is
excellent and includes a rather complete bibliography. There is also a German Treatise
on the Community which ranks with the Stein and Nicholson set: Wohlfarth, Everling,
Glaesner & Spring, Die Europaische Wirtshaftgemeinschaft, Kommentar zum Vertrag
(1960).
8 Cf. EEC Treaty, art. 3, CCH Common Market Rep. if 3471E, reprinted in Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community and connected documents, European
Community Information Service, Washington, D.C.; and CCH Common Market Rep. in
official French and German texts and in English.
4 See generally Froschmaier, Progress Toward the Proposed Conventions for a
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The drafters of the Rome Treaty knew that a uniform approach
in a number of fields was necessary to forge an economic union.°
Since divergent industrial property systems based on national bound-
aries can and do impede the free movement of goods between the
Member States, harmonization or a single patent system was bound to
be urged.° This is not meant to detract from the impressive plan for
a single patent system proposed by representatives of the six member
countries, but merely emphasizes that it was to be expected inasmuch
as the Treaty of Rome designates free competition—much as the
United States did in an earlier day—as the principal regulator of the
economic system.?
To make competition work requires that restrictive business
practices be controlled. It was only natural for the founders of the
Community to consider the effect that national patent systems in the
Community would have on the free flow of goods and the rate of
technological progress; and in what way these diverse, national sys-
tems would have to be controlled, harmonized, or otherwise coalesced
to promote rather than impede the underlying economic policies of
the Community.
While the push toward uniform patent systems or a single system
in the European Community was implicit in the concept of freeing
commerce between the Member States, this does not mean that other
forces—having starting points independent of the EEC movement—
have not also encouraged the Member States to draft a blueprint for
a European patent system promptly. 8
For many years, plans have been proposed and debated which
looked toward a regional or supranational patent system in Europe.
Starting as early as 1909, a single world-wide patent was suggested.
In 1919, proposals were revived for a single patent to cover the British
Commonwealth. In 1920, an arrangement for an international patent
was actually drafted in Paris, although it never went into operation.
During World War II, a number of detailed proposals were published
in Germany, and, in the post-World War II years, proposals for the
European Patent and for a European Trademark, 6 Patent, Trademark, & Copyright
J. Res. & Ed. 477 (1963), [hereinafter referred to as PTC J. Res. & Ed.]
5 See Stein, An American Lawyer Views European Integration: An Introduction,
in 1 American Enterprise in the European Common Market—A Legal Profile (Stein &
Nicholson ed. 1960).
a See Spencer, A European Patent: An Old and Vexing Problem, 42 J. Pat. Off.
Soc'y 371 (1960).
7 See the Statement by Judge Loevinger, the then Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division of the Dep't of Justice, before the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, March 14, 1963 (Reprinted in
CCH Common Market Rep. g 9049); Lecture of Mr. Pieter Verloren van Themaat,
Director General of the Competition Dept of the EEC Commission, Current Anti-
trust DeveIopmenis in the European Common Market and the Relation thereto of
Industrial Property Rights, 6 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 427 (1963).
13 See the text discussion at notes 13, 14 infra.
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creation of a single European patent office were made.' More recently,
the Council of Europe attempted to devise a European patent system
but abandoned the attempt in favor of efforts at harmonization."
Aside from the need to eliminate conflicts between the various
national patent laws so that they will not distort competition in the
economic and political union envisaged by the Treaty of Rome, and
the academic interest in supranational systems, the simple question
of economics has also acted as an accelerating catalyst for the pro-
posal of a common patent system in the European Community.
The present United States Commissioner of Patents and his pred-
ecessor have spoken on numerous occasions about the difficulties of
running the United States examination system efficiently." The spec-
tacular increase in the volume and complexity of technical information
that has to be classified, stored, and ultimately retrieved in order to
determine properly the novelty of an invention, and the continuing
difficulty of obtaining qualified people to serve as examiners, training
them, and then keeping them are well-known. 12
 Even assuming suffi-
cient numbers of technically trained persons are available to act as
patent examiners and that attractive enough salaries are offered to
divert them from industry, in the long run even this may not be enough
if the volume and complexity of technology continue to increase so
rapidly."
These problems are not unique to the United States patent sys-
tem. The Germans and the Dutch, who have had two of the best
examining systems in the world, have been finding it increasingly diffi-
cult to stay ahead of the tidal wave. As examining offices encounter
these obstacles, they look for ways to reduce duplication, increase
See Robbins, The Proposed New European Patent, .5 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 217
(1961). These early plans and the immediate background to the decision to draft a
European Patent Law are reviewed by Ladas, Industrial Property, in 1 American Enter-
prise in the European Common Market—A Legal Profile 235 (Stein & Nicholson ed.
1960).
to The Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on patents has been more suc-
cessful recently in reaching some consensus. See Goldsmith and Burnside, Harmonization
of European Patent Laws, 46 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 48 (1964), and text discussion at note
78 infra.
11 See, e.g., Address of Commissioner Edward J. Brenner, American Economy, The
Patent System, and the Bar, 46 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 607 (1964); Address of the then
Commissioner David L. Ladd, The Patent Office—An Old Line Agency in a Modern
World, 43 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 515 (1961).
12 See Testimony of Robert C. Watson, Commissioner of Patents, United States
Patent Office, Hearings on S. Res. 92, before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955)
161-66, 195-98; and the Annual Reports of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary for the 85th, 86th, 87th and 88th Con-
gresses (Comm. Prints 1957-64).
13 See 1961-62 Management Survey of the U. S. Patent Office Study, Subcommittee
on Patent, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1962).
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efficiency and, in many cases, cut out unnecessary operations. There
is much talk in international patent circles, at the present time, of
cooperation between patent offices in searching, evaluation, and infor-
mation retrieval.' Our own Patent Office is interested in finding ways
to avoid examining applications filed for defensive protection only,
and a Presidential Commission to study the patent system seems
certain to be appointed in 1965.' 5
Still another means for reducing the economic burden of exami-
nation, proposed first in France and the Netherlands and more recently
in the EEC, is to defer examination until it is clear that commercial
utilization is likely to occur. It is believed that this will reduce the
number of applications that have to be examined, and concomitantly,
reduce the load on inadequately staffed examining offices." Obviously,
the elimination of national offices would also reduce costs."
The aim of any European patent system proposal, therefore, is
to reduce duplication, to economize on resources while doing a better
job overall, and, in the context of the European Community, to regu-
late the protection of industrial property rights so that a proper bal-
ance between competition and legally authorized monopolies is main-
tained, if not always harmoniously, at least not injuriously.
DRAFT CONVENTION FOR A EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM
Rather than tackle the question of industrial property protection
at the time the Treaty of Rome was signed, the member countries left
it to possible harmonization or unification by separate treaty."
Originally, some persons thought that the most desirable way to
effect uniform treatment of industrial property in the Community
was to seek to harmonize the national laws of the six member coun-
14
 See Glaser et al., Research and Development Notes from the Patent Office, 46
J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 387 (1964); Ladd, ICIREPAT-Progress, Pitfalls and Prospects, 46
J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 39 (1964).
15
 See Address of Dr. William A. Easton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Science and Technology, The Patent System and Economic Growth, 46 J. Pat.
Off, Soc'y 833 (1964).
15
 The Netherlands has recently put its deferred examination system, which was a
model for the Common Market patent law, into operation. Although the results of the
experiment will not be able to be gauged, even tentatively, for some time, the system
will be watched closely for comparisons of predictions and facts. For an early draft of
the Dutch Revision, see Proposed Draft Law for Revision of Dutch Patent Law, 43
J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 784 (1961).
17 See Froschmaier, The Draft Convention on Patents in the Common Market,
11 Intl & Comp. L.Q. (Sapp. 1962, No. 4 at 50).
18
 Article 36 of the EEC Treaty expressly provides that the preceding articles will
not be obstacles to restrictions which are justifiable on the basis that they protect in-
dustrial property. Article 100, CCH Common Market Rep. II 3476E, of the EEC Treaty
specifically requires the EEC Council to seek harmonization of the laws of the Member
States where they directly affect the establishment or operation of the Common Market.
Article 3(h), CCH Common Market Rep. 1 251, of the EEC Treaty also emphasizes
harmonization. See Froschmaier, supra note 4.
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tries.' Yet others recognized at an early date that a slow, tedious path
would have to be followed to harmonize laws that are not only different
enough in themselves, but further, operate in social, economic and
political institutional frameworks which are disparate.' And, even
assuming similar laws, the territorial coverage of patents and trade-
marks would raise serious obstacles to the free flow of goods in the
Community. Thus, the basic decision was made to seek to draft a
common patent law which would incorporate all the substantive and
procedural provisions necessary to form an integrated patent system
for the Community.'
The Coordinating Committee established by the governments
of the Six to coordinate the working parties selected to draft conven-
tions for patents, trademarks and designs' met in October 1962, along
with the Undersecretaries of States of the Member States. The purpose
of this meeting was to consider the Draft Convention for a European
Patent Law which had been submitted by the working group, headed
by Dr. Haertel of the Federal Ministry of Justice of West Germany.
The Committee decided to publish the Draft without official considera-
tion so that opinions of interested groups could be solicited, and the
proper authorities of the member countries could examine it as to form
and substantive content." Although it has been published in an official
text only in French and German, the British Board of Trade has pro-
vided an unofficial English translation of the Draft.'
The Draft Convention is divided into 12 parts, includes some 217
articles, and constitutes an entire patent code similar to our Patent
19 It has been suggested that the emphasis may have now swung back toward
harmonization, see Goldsmith and Burnside, supra note 10.
20 Froschmaier, Patents, Trademarks and Licenses within the Community, 10 Intl
& Comp. L.Q. (Supp. 1961, No. 1 at 58); Unpublished remarks of Dr. Kurt Haertel
(delivered by Dr. Klaus Planner) at the Joint FBA-Villanova-Georgetown Conference
on Patents and Antitrust Problems in the European Economic Community, April 1963,
Philadelphia, Pa. Dr. Haertel is now President of the German Patent Office. See also
Action Program for the Second Stage of the Common Market, CCH Common Market
Rep. (SD-306) I[ 214.
21 See, e.g., Finnis, Industrial Property and the Common Market, 11 Intl & Comp.
L.Q. (Supp. 1962, No. 4 at 47); Weiser & Behrman, The Convention for European
Industrial Property Rights, 5 FTC J. Res. & Ed. 233 (1961); Robbins, The Proposed
New European Patent, 5 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 217 (1961).
22 The trademark and design drafts under Dr. de Haan, President of the Dutch
Patent Office, and Professor Roscioni, President of the Italian Patent Office, respectively,
are underway. See de Haan, The Protection of Trademarks, 11 Intl & Comp. L.Q.
(Stipp. 1962, No. 4 at 60). A general convention is also being drafted. It is expected
that drafts will be published in 1965.
28 For some comments, see Robbins, The European Patent Convention—Some
Present Viewpoints of the European Patent Profession, 45 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 295 (1963).
24 Draft Convention Relating to a European patent law, translated by the British
Board of Trade (1963) , , thereinafter referred to as the Draft Patent Convention]. The
Draft is also reproduced in CCH Common Market Rep. flf 3471-84L, and 45 J. Pat.
Off. Soc'y 182 (1963).
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Title 35 of the United States Code. Since there are no laws or institu-
tions now in existence which could organize and operate a European
patent system of the kind proposed, it was necessary to spell out all
of these details.' While the Draft Convention would continue many
arrangements that are well known in European patent laws, such as
renewal fees and the like, it also contains some novel procedural and
substantive features.
The System
The Draft Convention, if it is ratified by each of the contracting
countries of the European Community, will create a multi-nation
system that grants a single patent which has legal effect in all six
Member States, much as United States patents have effect in all fifty
states.' The European patent will be subject only to the provisions
of the new Draft. Moreover, it will be issued by a European Patent
Office and certain legal aspects of the patent grant will be determined
by an independent or supranational patent court. The official languages
will be English, French and German."
The European Patent Office will be an administration office com-
mon to all the contracting States and will contain examining divisions,
a board of appeal for initial appellate review, and revocation boards
to adjudicate questions of validity referred to it by national courts of
the contracting States. This office will also have jurisdiction over com-
pulsory licensing.28
The proposed European patent system is characterized by a
deferred examination system which represents a compromise between
the full examination system of the Germans and the registration sys-
tem of the French. The granting procedure will comprise two stages:
the first stage will terminate with the grant of a provisional patent,
and the second stage with confirmation of a final European patent,
or a final refusal to confirm.
The first stage will commence with the filing of the European
application." The office will examine the application to see if it meets
25 A summary analysis of the Draft Patent Convention is provided by the indefati-
gable United States expert on foreign patent laws, Mr. P. J. Federico of the United States
Patent Office, in 45 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 153-81 (1963).
25 Professor Hallstein draws this parallel in his lectures at Tufts University, supra
note 1. Of course, the EEC proposal is not the first viable Common Market of nations.
Many argue the English Commonwealth was the first effective multi-national patent
system. See, e.g., Harris, The First Modern Common Market: A Reinterpretation of the
[British] Commonwealth Experience in Industrial Property, 6 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 199
(1962).
27 Draft Patent Convention, art. 34, CCH Common Market Rep. 11 3473C.
28 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 31-65, CCH Common Market Rep. 1111 3473-74J.
28 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 66-67, CCH Common Market Rep. Fr 3475-75A.
This filing can be in the European Patent Office or in one of the national patent offices in
certain cases.
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all the formalities as to patentable subject matter, completeness of
specification and drawings, etc." If these are satisfied, a novelty
report will be requested from the International Patents Institute at
The Hague."'
The novelty report will thereafter be sent to the applicant. He is
given a final chance to revise his claims in view of the prior art dis-
covered. The provisional patent will then be granted and published,
along with the novelty report. This phase may take up to 18 months."
The provisional patent will remain in force for five years from
the date of its publication." However, if the validity of the provisional
patent (or a final European patent for that matter) is questioned in
an infringement action, it must be examined and confirmed (the second
stage) before the patent can be held to be infringed."'
The second stage commences with a request for examination of
the provisional patent by the provisional patentee or by a third party.'
As mentioned previously, unless the request is made during the five
year life of the provisional patent, the patent will lapse. A request
for examination will be published and the examining divisions of the
Office will consider the novelty of the invention and its inventive
merits. A final European patent will then be confirmed or finally
re fused
After the provisional patent is published and until a specified
time after a request for examination has been made, a limited, or what
is often called a "poor man's" opposition will be available to third
parties. Under this device, publications and other information may
be submitted to the Office for consideration if and when the second
stage examination for confirmation is initiated.' No elaborate inter-
partes opposition proceeding, as is now permitted in Germany, will
be provided since it was felt by the drafting group that such proceed-
30 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 68-71, 76, CCH Common Market Rep. 1111 3475B-
75E, 3476.
31 Draft Patent Convention, art. 78, CCH Common Market Rep. 11 347613. The
International Patents InStitute was established by a treaty between France and the
Benelux countries in 1947 (five other countries have adhered since its inception). Using the
facilities of the Dutch Patent Office, it makes searches and provides novelty reports for the
member countries or private individuals upon request.
- Some persons find it difficult to see how a deferred examination system is going to
reduce costs if a thorough novelty report is going to be requested in every case. It may
be just a question of whom the applicant has to pay for the search.
32 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 79-82, 84-86, CCH Common Market Rep.
till 3476C-76F, 3476H-76K.
33 Draft Patent Convention, art. 125, CCH Common Market Rep. ti 3479A.
34 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 176-77, CCH Common Market Rep. IN 3482B-
82C.
35 Draft Patent Convention, art. 88, CCH Common Market Rep. If 3476M.
36 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 88-104, CCH Common Market Rep. tit( 3476M-
77C. The third party must give his reasons for believing a final European patent should
not be granted. The provisional patentee is given a chance to controvert the arguments.
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ings were too lengthy, involved and expensive." Moreover, a patent
will always be subject to attack upon the discovery of any new or
previously undiscovered anticipating reference."
Aside from the deferred examination concept, which was first
suggested by the French and which is incorporated in the new Dutch
patent law," the validity of European patents will be determined by
the European Patent Office and European Patent Court, while the
national courts of the contracting States will have jurisdiction over
questions of infringement."
The conditions of patentability" require that the invention be
susceptible of industrial application, be novel and involve an inventive
step. The field of industrial application includes agriculture. Certain
additions to the kinds of inventions that can be patented constitute
steps forward with respect to the national legislation of some Member
States." Patents cannot be granted for inventions contrary to public
order or morality. In addition, plant or animal varieties, or essentially
biological processes for producing them, are excluded."
The conditions of novelty follow the French concept of absolute
novelty." The state of the art, therefore, comprises everything made
available to the public by written or oral description, by use, or by
any other way before the filing date of the application for a European
patent. This is a more stringent novelty requirement than that of
the German and American laws (foreign public use not there being a
bar), and, while it does not include prior national applications and
patents in the state of the art unless published prior to the filing date,
it does include earlier filed European applications.
The inventive step requirement is similar to United States patent
law in that it requires the invention to be "unobvious"; it is adopted
from the German and Dutch patent laws. 45
 The claim language deter-
mines the extent or scope of the protection but the description and
drawings are to be used to interpret the claims."
87
 See the Working Group's Note on third party oppositions following Article 91
of the Draft Patent Convention, CCH Common Market Rep. If 3476Q.
38
 Draft Patent Convention, art. 127, CCH Common Market Rep. lj 3479C.
86
 See text supra note 16. See also Weiser & Behrman, The Convention for European
Industrial Property Rights, supra note 21.
4° Draft Patent Convention, arts. 174, 177, CCH Common Market Rep. la 3482,
3482 C.
91 Draft Patent Convention, art. 9, CCH Common Market Rep. 3472.
42
 Federico, The Proposed European Patent Law—A Summary Analysis, 45 J. Pat.
Off, Soc'y 153, 158 (1963).
48 Draft Patent Convention, art. 10, CCH Common Market Rep. ¶ 3472A.
44 Draft Patent Convention, art, 11, CCH Common Market Rep. ¶ 3472B.
43
 Compare Article 13, CCH Common Market Rep. 3472D, of the Draft Patent
Convention with 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
46 Draft Patent Convention, art. 21, CCH Common Market Rep. 3472Q. This is
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Discussion of Specific Features
1. DEFERRED EXAMINATION : As noted earlier, the idea of a de-
ferred examination system finds its origin in French and Dutch pro-
posals, but its use is also dictated by economic necessity.47 It is not
a panacea for all patent problems, but it holds out the possibility
of (i) providing rapid protection for an inventor without impeding
his competitors, (ii) publishing the inventive contribution promptly,
and (iii) reducing the burden on national examining offices. It attacks
the heart of the problem, although there are conflicting views as to
whether this prescription is the best cure."
Both in Europe and in the United States, statistics indicate that
in the period of four to six years after the grant of a patent, many
of the patented inventions are commercially dead. For example, a
sample study" by The Patent, Trademark and Copyright Research In-
stitute of the George Washington University found that approximately
50% of the inventions covered by patents are commercially exploited
at one time or another. Of this 50%, about 40% are used before the
patents are filed, about 50% went into use during pendency of the ap-
plications, and an additional 8% are put into use during the first five
years of the patents' life. This means that over 98% of all the use
has, at least, begun by the time a patent has been issued five years.
Such patterns of use, which are also reflected in the statistics on
the payment of renewal fees in the European countries,'" no doubt
made the patent working group believe that if a full scale examination
could be deferred for a period up to approximately five years, it might
eliminate the need for examining and issuing a substantial proportion
of the patents for inventions that will never find their way into use.
It is also true that the five year interval has the further advantage
of providing a period during which the patent owner can assess his
commercial prospects and, if they do not appear to bear out his orig-
similar to present German and Dutch law but is a marked departure from the French
use of a "Résumé" rather than claims.
47 Commentary to Proposed Modification of Dutch Patent Law, 43 J. Pat, Off. Soc'y
743 (1961).
48 For example, a debate was held at the Annual Meeting of the American Patent
Law Association in January 1965 with respected and experienced lawyers agreeing on the
existence of the problems deferred examination is supposed to cure but disagreeing on
the usefulness of the technique.
49 Sanders, Sources and Uses of Patented Inventions, S PTC J. Res. & Ed. 25 (Con-
ference No. 1961).
59 See the statistics on the payment of renewal fees by selected foreign countries
which are incorporated in the Statement of the Commissioner of Patents on Fee Bill
H.R. 10966, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., at pp. 81, 104-05 (1962). See also Federico, Renewal Fees
and Other Patent Fees in Foreign Countries, Study No. 17 of the Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1958).
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inal optimism, allow the provisional patent to lapse without incurring
the substantial additional cost of a complete examination."
The deferred examination system proposed by the Draft Con-
vention does not prevent an applicant from asking for an immediate
examination. Instead, it merely gives him the option to defer it for
the first five years if he so desires, provided no third party requests it.
If a third party requests an examination, the third party will bear a
substantial part of the cost." This, in itself, will reduce the expense
to the applicant.
The requirement of a novelty report to accompany the provisional
patent is a compromise designed to safeguard competitors to some
extent. It will identify art that has been uncovered so that competitors
can make some reasonable assessment of the probability of the pro-
visional patent being confirmed as a final European patent. If a third
party is still uncertain and cannot afford to wait five years to see if
the provisional patent will be allowed to lapse, he may request the
examination.
2. INVALIDATION PROCEDURE: Invalidation and revocation pro-
cedures" will be available irrespective of whether an infringement
action has been brought. The final European patent will be cancelled
if the description is inadequate or the invention was not patentable.
A final decision of revocation will apply to the patent retroactively.
Moreover, anyone may ask that a patent be revoked, including a Mem-
ber State which intervenes in the public interest. The proceeding will
take place before Revocation Boards of the European Patent Office
as of right.
The invalidation procedure wilI be similar to the revocation proce-
dure. In both cases, validity will be considered to be an interpretation
of the Convention which will come under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the supranational authority."
Where an infringement action is instituted, whether on a pro-
visional or a final European patent, and if the defendant questions
the validity of the patent, the national court will suspend the infringe-
ment action and refer the question to the European authority. In
.other words, once invalidity is raised as a defense, the infringement
action will be suspended and a revocation or confirmation proceeding
will be conducted in the European Patent Office with a right of appeal
to the European Patent Court. In fact, when it would be decisive in an
51 Froschmaier, supra note 4.
62 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 164- ,58, CCH Common Market Rep. Ili 3481L-
81Q.
" Draft Patent Convention, arts. 127-35, CCII Common Market Rep. IN 3479C-
79L.
Ga Draft Patent Convention, arts. 177, 179, CCH Common Market Rep. lig 3482C,
3482E.
550
PATENTS AND ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
infringement suit, an interpretation of any provision of the Convention
can be obtained by a declaratory judgment action or, on reference,
by a preliminary decision of the European Patent Court." For ex-
ample and judging from American experience, when the scope of a
claim is uncertain, even though the patent has been held to be valid,
the European authority may have to determine the scope of the claim
in order to assure uniform treatment throughout the Community.
3. COEXISTENCE OF EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL PATENTS: For an
indefinite period of time, it is envisaged that the European patents
and national patents will coexist," although if a party has filed for a
European patent, he will not be allowed to obtain the other because
the European patent will be treated as a national patent (the contrary
is not true). Even though both will be obtainable in some cases, they
will not both be enforceable in the same geographical area.
As has been suggested before, one of the reasons for having a
common patent system is to permit national patent systems to be
discarded as soon as feasible. But for an indefinite period of time, it
will be necessary for them to coexist. During this period, efforts will
be made to harmonize the national laws, insofar as possible pursuant
to Article 100 of the Rome Treaty. 57 While some argue national
patents will always be useful," it is generally believed that as soon as
the European patent system is in full operation, provided the other
institutions of the Community appear permanent, most of the member
countries will eliminate their national patent systems—for the same
set of economic reasons that Ied them to adopt a deferred examination
system in the first place.
4. COMPULSORY LICENSING: The Draft Convention provides for
compulsory licensing under certain conditions." Although the members
of the working party discussed the pros and cons of compulsory
tensing extensively and disagreed, the majority decided that compul-
sory licenses should be granted by the European Patent Office and
that they should have effect in the whole of the Market." Article 136
of the Draft Convention provides for the granting of compulsory li-
censing in three situations: (i) in case of insufficient manufacture or
utilization of the patented invention, (ii) in the case of dependent
patents, and (iii) in certain cases provided for in the treaty estab-
lishing Euratom.
65 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 180-81, CCH Common Market Rep. gn 3482F-
82G.
55 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 6, 185-205, CCH Common Market Rep. if 347114,
3483-83V.
57 See, e.g., Draft Patent Convention, art. 207, CCH Common Market Rep. f 3484A.
" Robbins, supra note 22.
59 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 136-52, CCH Common Market Rep. IN 3480-80R.
60 Draft Patent Convention, art. 144, CCH Common Market Rep .  fl 3480H.
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As to the first situation, after three years from the grant of the
provisional patent, or four years after its filing date if later, the
compulsory license may be applied for if the invention covered by
the patent has not been manufactured or utilized within the territory
to an extent sufficient to meet the combined needs of the Member
States. Meeting the Community needs by importation (e.g., from an
American manufacturer) will not be sufficient, although legitimate
reasons for not complying will be accepted. Actual manufacture with-
in the Community will be required. 8'
As to the second situation, if an invention is protected by a patent
but cannot be exploited without infringing a dominating patent, a
compulsory license will be granted to the owner of the later patent
to the extent necessary for him to exploit the invention covered by
his own grant. The license will require the subservient holder to license
the dominating patent holder if the inventions have the same indus-
trial objective. This sort of compulsory license can be obtained even
though the dominating patent is a national patent.'
In applying for a compulsory license for any reason, the applicant
must show that he could not obtain a license from the patentee on
reasonable terms, and he must offer a guarantee that he will adequately
work the invention if the license is granted.'
Compulsory license requests will be handled by an Invalidity
Board of the European Patent Office. Any compulsory license will be
non-exclusive, on reasonable terms, and may include any reasonable
restrictions or conditions. In operation, the compulsory license grant
will be treated much as equity decrees are treated by American courts;
changes in circumstances will always justify reopening the matter to
consider the continuance of the license, the amount of the royalties,
or the territoriality and conditions of the grant."
It will also be possible for a member country to request that a
compulsory license be granted in the public interest, but if granted,
it will be limited to the country asking for it.'
5. RIGHTS CONFERRED BY EUROPEAN PATENT: Since one of the
main reasons for proposing a single European patent system is to
prevent national industrial property systems from splitting up the
Common Market, it is not surprising that the working party and the
officials of the member countries have been careful to evaluate the
61
 The working group split on this requirement. See Note following art. 136, CCH
Common Market Rep. 3480, of the Draft Patent Convention.
€12 Draft Patent Convention, art. 137, CCH Common Market Rep. f 3480A.
83 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 139-40, CCH Common Market Rep. TM 3480C-
80D.
64 Draft Patent Convention, arts. 141, 143, CCH Common Market Rep. 1111 3480E,
3480G.
65 Draft Patent Convention, art. 144, CCH Common Market Rep. If 3480H.
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effect of the proposed common patent on Community markets." Euro-
pean patents are to have effect on the whole of the territories of the
contracting States," and the majority view spells this out."
While territorial licensing will be permissible under the first
variant of article 20—even when the territories are defined by the
geographic boundaries of the Member States—such restrictions will
apply only to the so-called "first sale," and in all cases, the buyer
cannot be held liable. Once an article has been put on the market in
one of the contracting States by the owner, it cannot thereafter be
restrictively controlled by way of a license agreement in that or any
other country.'" It is not without significance that the question of
whether the Treaty of Rome will sanction restrictions on competition
of any sort is intentionally left open by the published Draft.
6. THIRD PARTY RELATIONS: So far, comments on the Common
Market patent have been restricted to its origin, substantive scope,
and procedural innovations. Also of interest to Americans is the extent
to which the common patent will be available to third party nationals. 7°
Two main questions are raised by the Draft Convention as to third
parties generally: (i) availability of the European patent to nationals
of non-contracting States, and (ii) accession to the Convention or
association with the Community by nations not privy to the Treaty
of Rome.
Article 5 of the Draft proposes two extreme solutions on availa-
bility and suggests that intermediate solutions are possible. These are
important to American nationals. Accession and association, which
are covered in Articles 211 and 212 of the Draft Patent Convention,
are of less immediate importance to American citizens.
The first variant of article 5 places no nationality restriction on
an applicant for a European patent. It is similar to the United States
patent law in that a national of any country can apply for a patent.
The patent laws of most other countries are similar in this respect.
Since this variant of article 5 does not distinguish between applicants
on the basis of nationality, European patents could be applied for by
nationals of any country, whether members of the EEC or not.
The second variant of article 5 would allow a European patent
to be applied for only by a national of one of the contracting countries,
all Draft Patent Convention, arts. 18-22, 25-30, CCH Common Market Rep.
3472I-72R, 3472U-72Z.
67
 Draft Patent Convention, art. 18, CCH Common Market Rep. 34721.
118
 Draft Patent Convention, art. 20, CCH Common Market Rep. 1[ 3472K, 1st
Variant. The 2d Variant of article 20, CCH Common Market Rep.
	 3472P, would
restrict the European patent to a scope commensurate with national patents.
06
 Draft Patent Convention, art. 20(a), CCH Common Market Rep. if 3472L.
70
 See Weiser, The European Common Market Patent Convention: The Right to
Apply for a Common Market Patent, 6 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 317 (1962).
553
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
and then, only if the applicant first files an application for a national
patent in one of the contracting States.
If the second variant were in force, national patent offices could
not be eliminated. Otherwise, nationals of non-contracting countries,
even if they were members of the Paris Union," could not obtain any
patent protection whatsoever. It also runs counter to the priority
principle of the Convention." A knowledge of the history of the
present Draft makes it hard to believe that the Member States want
to assume the financial burdens of two systems, although other rea-
sons are advanced for restricting availability."
Aside from the economics of dual patent systems, the second
variant raises international legal questions since the six contracting
States are members of the Paris Union. The United States and some
forty-four other non-EEC countries are members of this Union, a
convention which, among other things, requires national treatment,
that is, it requires that each Paris Union member country grant the
same industrial property protection to nationals of all the other mem-
ber countries that it grants to its own nationals."
If the European Patent Convention is signed with this second
variant, the contracting countries will offer to their own nationals two
ways to protect inventions—national patents in the individual member
countries, or a European patent—whereas the nationals of non-con-
tracting countries will have only one avenue of protection, i.e., under
the national laws of the contracting States.
If the substantive rights under the common system and the
national laws of each country were or are identical, it might be hard
to argue real discrimination,' but since it is apparent that the scope
of a European patent will be superior in some cases, e.g., as to drugs,
then inequality seems fairly clear. 76
71 The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which
was signed in Paris in 1883 and last amended in Lisbon in 1958, is known as the Paris
Union or Paris Convention.
72 The right of priority under the International Convention permits an applicant
to obtain the priority date of his first filed application in other Convention countries if
he files in the other countries within one year of his initial application.
" See Was, Access to the European Patent, 7 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 7 (1963); Roditi,
An Argument Against Accession, 45 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 310 (1963); Weiser, Patent and
Antitrust Development and Prospects of the European Economic Community, 8 PTC
J. Res. & Ed. 1 (1964).
74 This is sought to be avoided by calling the Draft Patent Convention a special
arrangement as permitted by Article 15 of the International Convention. See Draft Patent
Convention Preamble.
75 Ulmer, The Availability of European Patents and the Paris Convention, 2 Indus-
trial Property 51 (1963).
76 de Haan, The Proposed EEC Patent Convention: Problems and Prospects, in
Doing Business in the Common Market, a special report by CCH reprinting addresses
delivered at the European Common Market Conference, National Law Center, The
554
PATENTS AND ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
Persons who indorse this restrictive point of view justify it -
calling it a special arrangement such as those concluded under Article
15 of the Paris Union. But the examples are inapposite. An applicant's
substantive rights will be curtailed if he cannot apply for an EEC
patent, whereas the special arrangements concluded to date under
article 15 have been no more than procedural inconveniences to the
non-contracting parties. National treatment and priority are the main
principles of the International Convention, and both appear to be
violated by this restrictive variant."
The winds of change are not limited to the European Economic
Community. As alluded to earlier, they are being felt in the Council
of Europe and in the Scandinavian countries. In the last few years,
the Council of Europe has fashioned two minor conventions which
have gone into effect, and its Committee of Experts on Patents has
drafted a convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substan-
tive Law on Patents for Invention. These may not be too important
standing alone but collectively they may presage greater successes. 78
The Scandinavian countries have recently put into effect a common
patent granting system after marking time for a few years to see what
the Member States of the Common Market intended to do.
Regional economic integration, particularly of the underdeveloped
countries, has also led to the establishment of a regional patent office
in Africa under the auspices of the African and Malagasy Organization
for Economic Cooperation. Fourteen nations have ratified the agree-
ment to subscribe to a common patent, trademark and design law."
ANTITRUST POLICY OF THE COMMUNITY AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
The activities of the Member States of the Community are de-
signed to convert six national markets into a single one. It is for this
reason that the Six are considering dismantling barriers to interstate
trade which result from, or are natural concomitants of, national
patent systems. From this follows, too, the interest in practices that
tend to restrict or distort trade among the contracting States—export
George Washington University, April 9 and 10, 1963 at p. 100; see also Froschmaier,
supra note 17.
77
 The previous Commissioner of Patents, David L. Ladd, devoted most of his
Address before the Annual Meeting of the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of
the American Bar Association in San Francisco to these questions, reprinted in 44 J. Pat.
Off. Soc'y 583 (1962).
78 See Goldsmith and Burnside, Harmonization of European Patent Laws, 46 J. Pat.
Off, Soc'y 48 (1964),
70
 Sec The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Underdeveloped
Countries, Report by the Secretary General, U.N. Eco, and Soc. Council (E/3861, E/C
5/52/Rev. 1), 9 March 1964 (pursuant to Gen. Assembly Res. 1713 XVI). This report
is an excellent survey of the patent laws of the world and the viewpoints of the various
national governments on patents and economic development.
555
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
clauses in exclusive distributorship agreements, forms of licensing
agreements and the structure of joint ventures to name a few. 8°
Although the antitrust aspects of the Community cannot be
covered in detail in this article, the incidence of antitrust policies on
patents, and the role patents often play in promoting restrictive busi-
ness practices should be discussed here. 81 Articles 85 and 86 of the
Rome Treaty implement article 3 which sets forth certain activities
necessary to the realization of Community goals; among these is "the
establishment of a system ensuring that competition in the Common
Market is not distorted." 82
We are mainly concerned with article 85 83 which covers distortion
80 See van Themaat, supra note 7; Weiser, Antitrust Policy and Industrial Property
Policy in the European Economic Community, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 496, 506 (1963); see
generally Weiser, Antitrust Aspects of the Joint Venture in the European Economic
Community, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 421 (1963).
81 Cf. Ladas, Antitrust Law in the Common Market with Special Reference to
Industrial Property Agreements, 23 Ohio St. B.J. 709 (1963); Weiser, Antitrust Policy and
Industrial Property Policy in the European Economic Community, supra note 80. On
the antitrust law of the Member States and restrictive business practice policy in general,
see Riesenfeld, The Protection of Competition, in 2 American Enterprise in the European
Common Market: A Legal Profile (Stein & Nicholson ed. 1960).
82 EEC Treaty, art. 3(f), CCH Common Market Rep. I[ 251.
88
 Article 85, CCH Common Market Rep. VI 2005, 2031, 2051 reads:
1. The following practices shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
Common Market: All agreements between enterprises, all decisions by associa-
tions of enterprises and all concerted practices which are liable to affect trade
between the Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict or distort
competition within the Common Market or which have this effect. This shall, in
particular, include:
(a) The direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other
trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development
or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application of unequal conditions to parties undertaking equivalent
engagements in commercial transactions thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(e) making the conclusion of a contract subject to the acceptance by the
other party to the contract of additional obligations, which, by their
nature or according to commercial practice, have no connection with
the subject of such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall
automatically be null and void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
any agreement or type of agreement between enterprises,
any decision or type of decision by associations of enterprises, and,
any concerted practice or type of concerted practice which helps to
improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote technical
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the result-
ing profit and which does not:
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of competition inasmuch as article 86 pertains only to abuses of a
dominant position. Briefly, article 85(1) establishes a general prohi-
bition for certain types of practices which are, or tend to be restrictive,
while article 85(3) constitutes a legislative "rule of reason" designed
in certain cases and under certain conditions 84 to ameliorate the harsh-
ness of the blanket prohibition contained in article 85(1). 55
The EEC Commission has issued regulations" and communi-
cations," which among other subjects deal with patents," designed
to reduce the burden on the Commission and the registrants. The Com-
mission has decided to grant exemptions for categories of restrictive
agreements which would comply with the requirements of article
85(3) based on their characteristic features, and to establish princi-
ples of interpretation to avoid notification of agreements which, in
the Commission's view, do not fall under the ban of article 85(1)."'
Pursuant to this philosophy, the initial communication listed a
series of clauses in patent licensing agreements which were not con-
sidered to be prohibited under article 85(1). These are:
A. Obligations imposed on the licensee, the purpose of
which is:
1. The limitation of the methods of exploitation of the
invention provided for in the patent rights (manu-
facture, use, distribution) to certain persons;
(a) subject the concerns in question to any restrictions which are not
indispensable to the achievement of the above objectives;
(b) enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a
substantial part of the goods concerned.
84 Before article 85(1) is even applicable, certain conditions must be present. There
must be (i) an agreement between enterprises, decision or concerted practice, (ii) likely
to affect trade between the Member States, which (iii) have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market. Where an
exemption under article 85(3) is sought, it must fit the conditions established therein.
85 See generally Coing, Interpretational Problems of Article 85, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
441 (1963); van Themaat, Introduction, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 435 (1963).
86 See Regulation 17 (1962), CCH Common Market Rep. 1! 2401; Regulation 27
(1962), CCH Common Market Rep. If 2651; Regulation 59 (1962), CCH Common
Market Rep. 2441.10, 2461.10; Regulation 153 (1962), CCH Common Market Rep.
II 2694; Regulation 99/63, CCH Common Market Rep. 112635; Regulation 118/63, CCH
Common Market Rep. If 2461.10.
87 Communication relative aux accords de license de brevets (December 24, 1962),
CCH Common Market Rep, ll 2694D.
88 Regulation 17 requires that agreements coming within the purview of article 85(1)
be registered with the Commission. Although registration is a voluntary act, an exemption
under article 85(3) cannot be obtained unless the agreement has been registered, and in
a timely manner as required. See Mussard, The Regulation of the Restrictive Business
Practices Under the Common Market Treaty, 11,Int'l & Comp. L.Q. (Supp. 1962, No. 4
at 16); Weiser, Freedom of Competition in the European Economic Community; An
Analysis of the Regulations Implementing the Antitrust Provisions, 6 PTC J. Res. & Ed.
20 (1962).
89 See van Themaat Lecture, supra note 7.
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2. The limitation
(a) of the manufacture of the patented product,
(b) of the application of the patented process to
specified fields of technical application;
3. The limitation on the quantity of the product to be
manufactured or on the number of times the process
is to be used;
4. The limitation on the utilization
(a) in time (license of shorter duration than the
patent),
(b) in area (regional license for a portion of the
territory in which the patent is valid, license
limiting utilization to one location or to one
specified factory),
(c) as to person (limitation on the power to dispose
of the license, such as the prohibition to assign
the license or to grant sublicenses).
B. Obligations on the licensee to affix patent information on
the product.
C. Standards of quality or obligations imposed upon the li-
censee with respect to the obtaining of supplies of certain
products, insofar as they are indispensable for a tech-
nically proper utilization of the patent.
D. Agreements concerning the communication of know-how
acquired during the utilization of the invention or the
granting of licenses on improvements or on new uses;
these, however, are valid with respect to obligations
assumed by the licensee only if they are not exclusive
and if the licensor has assumed similar obligations.
E. Agreements by the licensor:
1. not to authorize any other person to utilize the in-
vention;
2. not to utilize the invention himself.
The Commission was careful not to apply the exemption to agree-
ments involving patent pools, reciprocal licenses, and multiple parallel
licenses; °0
 agreements relating to other rights of industrial property
or to know-how;" and, agreements which may include clauses other
iqt Communication, CCH Common Market Rep. fl 2694D, and van Themaat, supra
note 7.
91
 Van Notten, Know-How Licensing in the Common Market, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
558
PATENTS AND ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
than the above listed ones." As to these latter types of agreements,
the general rules set out in articles 85 and 86 are applicable and each
decision will have to be based on a specific fact pattern. 93
The regulations also permit a party to request a negative clear-
ance from the force of article 85(1) and article 86. 94 For negative
clearances, the Commission has concurrent jurisdiction with the Mem-
ber States."
It also must be emphasized that the guide lines established by
official communications from the EEC Commission do not bind the
Commission for all times, even where the agreements are other than
independent or individual ones. Moreover, they do not restrict the
Court of Justice in reaching its own conclusion. The Commission pre-
fers to build up its antitrust law on a case-by-case basis, much as we
have done in the United States." On the other hand, the Commission
wants to give interested parties some idea of its thinking about certain
types and categories of restrictive provisions in agreements parcelling
out rights in legally recognized patent monopolies." The policy of the
EEC Commission is conciliatory whereas the approach of the United
States has relied nearly entirely on case-to-case adjudication.
525 (1963); Nash, The Concept of "Property" in Know-How as a Growing Area of
Industrial Property: Its Sale and Licensing, 6 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 289 (1962).
92
 A clause must not run afoul of the prohibitions in Article 36, CCH Common
Market Rep. ¶ 3473E, of the EEC Treaty to the effect that the "prohibitions or restric-
tions" for the protection of industrial property shall not constitute either a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. Paraphrasing article 85(3),
CCH Common Market Rep. 2051, the "prohibitions or restrictions" must improve
production or distribution of products or promote technical or economic progress while
reserving to consumers an equitable share of advantages, and without imposing unessential
restrictions on the enterprises and without enabling enterprises to eliminate competition
with respect to a substantial portion of the products concerned.
93 The law of unfair competition in the EEC and in the Member States is also inti-
mately related to the lines of demarcation between legitimate patent monopoly and
antitrust abuse. See Ulmer, The Law of Unfair Competition and the Conflict of Laws,
4 Am. J. Comp. L. 167 (1955); and articles on law of unfair competition in some
of the Member States collected in 11 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. (Supp. 1962, No. 1).
04 Regulation 17, art. 2, CCH Common Market Rep, ti 2411. "Negative Clearance"
is a procedure for submitting an article 85(1) agreement to the Commission for an
article 85(3) clearance in 'advance.
05 Weiser, supra note 88.
98 Additional light should be shed on Commission policy from the sort of fact
patterns which prompt the Commission to grant negative clearances. Requests for negative
clearances and the decisions published to date are: Grosfillex Co., CCH Common Market
Rep. 7020; Convention Faience, CCH Common Market Rep. ¶ 7022; S. A. Mertens and
Straet, CCII Common Market Rep. ti 7024; S. A. Nicholas Freres, CCH Common
Market Rep. ti 7025; Dutch Engineers & Contractor's Association, CCH Common Market
Rep. ¶ 7030; and Maison, Jallatte S.A., CCH Common Market Rep. ¶ 7031.
97 In this respect, see also Written Questions Nos. 61 and 71 posed to the EEC
Commission, CCH Common Market Rep. 7001, 7002; and First Commission Recom-
mendation on Application of Treaty Article 85 (May 1964), CCH Common Market Rep.
7023,
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CONCLUSION
The future of this common patent system is uncertain. Since
publication of the Draft for comment in late 1962, the Member States
have scheduled and deferred a number of meetings at which final
decisions were to be made on disputed features of the system and
time schedules established for putting it into operation. Much of the
delay has been a result of the disagreement between the contracting
States on the larger issues pertaining to the development of an eco-
nomic and political union." As and when these are resolved, we may
expect this common patent system to take on new life.
The early momentum which bid fair to inaugurate the European
patent system substantially as proposed has been dissipated. It is
therefore quite likely that the divergent opinions, which were subli-
mated in the Draft Convention by the fast pace of the European Com-
munity in general, will dictate a number of changes in the final pro-
visions. Nonetheless, the fact that the United States is going to
consider various features of the proposed EEC system as possible
solutions for some of its own problems, and the fact that the Dutch
have already made substantial changes in their patent examination
system along the lines of the Draft Convention, attest to the vitality
and importance of the basic concepts.
A strong movement, probably an irreversible one, has been started
by the Member States of the European Economic Community in the
field of industrial property and the restrictive business practices re-
lated to it. Americans have no choice but to keep abreast of its ebb
and flow if they are to compete successfully for the important Euro-
pean Market in the years ahead.
98 This is the thrust of the interviews with EEC officials reported in Weiser, Patent
and Antitrust Development and Prospects of the European Economic Community, 8
PTC J. Res. & Ed. 1 (1964).
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